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REVIEWING THE REVIEW BOARDS: WHY 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD LIABILITY 
DOES NOT MAKE GOOD BUSINESS SENSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In modern decades, the use of humans as participants in medical 
research studies has increased. An estimated “20 million Americans [are] 
tak[ing] part in more than 41,000 clinical trials.”1 With the recent rise in 
human research, there has been a concomitant increase in the prevalence 
and utility of committees overseeing human research activities.2 One type 
of oversight committee is the Institutional Review Board (IRB).3 Federal 
regulations established IRBs as bodies associated with a given research 
institution that review and approve research activities conducted by that 
institution.4 IRBs are charged with protecting the rights of research 
subjects and ensuring that certain health and safety requirements are met, 
both before the research commences and during the research period.5 In 
1998, there were an estimated three to five thousand IRBs in the United 
States.6 The National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Bell Report found that 
the annual workload of 491 IRBs included an estimated 284,000 reviews.7  
In addition to the increase in human-subject research, there has also 
been an increase in injured research subjects filing suit against the 
researchers conducting the studies and the affiliated research institutions.8 
Given the rise in research protocols and the associated need for IRB 
review, it is only a matter of time before injured research subjects 
 1. Tom Abate, Experiments on Humans: Business of Clinical Trials Soars, But Risks Unknown, 
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 4, 2002, at A1. 
 2. See generally Micheale C. Christian et al., A Central Institutional Review Board for Multi-
Institutional Trials, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (2002) (discussing the increased workload of 
IRBs and the attendant problems with inadequate review of research protocols).  
 3. See generally Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2003); Protection of Human 
Subjects, 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2004) (providing a framework for the establishment, function, and 
duties of IRBs). 
 4. 45 C.F.R. § 46; 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56. 
 5. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.108–.109. 
 6. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Pub. No. OEI-01-97-00193, at 3 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Off., 1998). 
 7. Christian et al., supra note 2, at 1405 n.2 (citation omitted). Of the 284,000 reviews, 105,000 
were initial reviews, 116,000 were annual reviews, and 63,000 were amendments to the original 
approved proposals. Id. The study also found that annual full-board meeting time ranged from nine to 
fifty hours and that the average time devoted to discussion of the initial review of a protocol was 
twenty-one minutes for low-volume IRBs and three minutes for high-volume IRBs. Id.  
 8. See infra Parts II.D and E.  
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regularly target IRBs—both as board members and individuals—as 
defendants in liability suits.9 As the gatekeepers of human research 
studies, the question arises about what duty, if any, IRBs owe to human 
subjects who have been injured in a research study which the IRB 
approved.10  
This Note explores IRB liability and the question of the potential duty 
IRBs owe to injured research subjects. In Part II, this Note details 
government regulation of human-subject research and provides examples 
of historical and current research trials and negligence actions involving 
human subjects.11 Part III discusses the potential for IRB liability.12 Part 
IV considers how corporate law principles of liability apply to IRBs and 
suggests ideas to improve IRB operation and function.13  
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS REGARDING HUMAN-SUBJECT 
RESEARCH AND CASES INVOLVING INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
A. History of Human-Subject Research 
The first heavily publicized use of human-subject research occurred 
during World War II when the Nazis conducted medical experiments on 
German concentration-camp prisoners.14 In some concentration camps, 
doctors infected healthy prisoners with yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, 
cholera, and diphtheria to study those diseases.15 Hundreds of prisoners 
died unnecessarily as a result of those Nazi studies.16  
Despite its strong condemnation of Nazi human experimentation, the 
United States has not been immune to human research abuses. In 1963, 
researchers at the Jewish Chronic Disease Center Hospital in Brooklyn 
injected live cancer cells into elderly nursing home patients, most of 
 9. Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Lawsuits Against IRBs: Accountability or Incongruity?, 
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220, 224 (2001). “IRB members—both individually and as a board—may be 
exposed to legal liability for any failures, deliberate or otherwise, associated with the human subjects 
research they are charged with approving and monitoring.” Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See generally Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at 
Nuremberg, 22 YALE J. INT’L. L. 401 (1997). 
 15. ALLEN M. HORNBLUM, ACRES OF SKIN: HUMAN EXPERIMENTS AT HOLMSBURG PRISON 75 
(1998). 
 16. Id.  
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whom were senile.17 The nursing home residents were not told the reason 
for the injections, nor were they aware of their participation in any study.18  
Similarly, another study in New York employed unsuspecting 
subjects.19 Researchers at Willowbrook, a facility for mentally disabled 
children and adults, intentionally infected patients with hepatitis so the 
researchers could study a vaccine for the disease.20 Parents of the children 
involved were coerced into allowing their children to be injected with 
hepatitis because the parents believed their children would inevitably 
become infected by joining the facility’s general patient population.21  
Perhaps the most egregious abuse committed in the name of research 
was the notorious Tuskegee Syphilis Study, where researchers studied the 
effects of untreated syphilis in a group of African-American men, without 
their knowledge, for over twenty years.22 Although medical advances 
created a successful treatment for syphilis, it was not offered to the 
subjects.23  
 17. Harold Y. Vanderpool, Introduction and Overview: Ethics, Historical Case Studies, and the 
Research Enterprise, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1, 9 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed., 1996).  
 Patients in the Jewish Chronic Disease Center Hospital study were not told about the experiments. 
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 206 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1965). The study only came to the 
public forefront because a board member of the institution wanted to ascertain whether the patients 
involved had been injured, and sued to gain access to the patients’ medical records. Id. 
 Despite the fact that the researcher’s medical license was suspended and he was put on probation 
by the Board of Medical Examiners, the researcher was elected President of the American Association 
of Cancer Research only five years later. B.A. Preminger, The Case of Chester M. Southam: Research 
Ethics and the Limits of Professional Responsibility, 65(2) THE PHAROS OF ALPHA OMEGA ALPHA 4 
(Spring 2002); see also MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW, § 23.01 
(2003).  
 18. BENDER, supra note 17, at § 23.01. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. In the 1950s and 1960s, hepatitis was endemic among the Willowbrook patients. Id. 
Researchers vaccinated children and then infected them with hepatitis upon admission to the facility to 
determine if the vaccine was effective. Id. Although the parents of the children consented, they had 
been told by the researchers that the children would get the disease anyway when they joined the 
general hospital population. Id. The vaccine proved to be effective, yet there was no guarantee of this 
result at the time the children were vaccinated. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. William J. Curran, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 730 (1973). In 1932, 
there was no effective treatment for syphilis. BENDER, supra note 17, at § 23.01. Physicians affiliated 
with the United States Public Health Service studied 400 African-American males in Alabama who 
had syphilis. Id. The subjects, who believed that they were receiving adequate care, were not told that 
they were research subjects. Id. When penicillin was recognized as an effective treatment for syphilis, 
it was not offered to the men. Id. Rather, the researchers continued with the study to observe the 
natural progression of the disease and, consequently, the men were not given available treatments and 
suffered unnecessarily. Id. 
 23. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. Government Regulation of Human-Subject Research 
Realizing that research abuses would continue, national and 
international governments intervened to enact a set of rules to regulate 
research involving human subjects.24 In 1945, in response to the Nazi 
concentration-camp experiments, judges of the international military 
tribunal conducted the Nazi Doctors’ Trial at Nuremberg25 and issued a 
verdict.26 Known as the Nuremberg Code,27 the verdict established ten 
principles for the conduct of research involving human subjects.28 In 
addition, doctors and scientists of the World Medical Assembly adopted 
the Declaration of Helsinki.29 The Declaration set international guidelines 
for biomedical research conducted by physicians.30  
The United States followed international example, beginning with the 
NIH establishing internal policies regarding research with human subjects, 
which were the first of their kind in the nation.31 These policies were later 
codified as federal regulations issued by the Department of Health, 
 24. See infra Parts II.B and C.  
 25. War Crimes Tribunals, An In Depth Analysis From: Issues and Controversies on File, at 
http://www.facts.com/icof/nurem.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). Following World War II, the 
victorious allies (the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) established an 
international military tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany and commenced international war-crimes trials. 
Id. Prosecutors from these countries investigated the Nazi Germans’ involvement in “crimes against 
humanity” and consequently entered a verdict against these individuals. Id. The verdict later became 
known as the Nuremberg Code. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Scandals and Tragedies of Research with Humans, in ETHICAL 
AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 1, 2 (2003). 
 28. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 181–82 (U.S. 
Gov’t Printing Off., 1949).  
 The Nuremberg Code sets forth many of the basic principles governing ethical research conduct 
for experiments involving humans. Id. The first provision explicates that “[t]he voluntary consent of 
the human subject is absolutely essential.” Id. at 181. Other provisions deal with several major 
tenants—human consent issues (the capacity to consent, freedom from coercion, and comprehension 
of the risks and benefits involved) and minimization of risk and harm, favorable risk/benefit ratio, 
qualified investigators using appropriate research designs, and freedom for the subject to resign at any 
time. Id. at 182; see also Office for Protection from Research Risks, Institutional Review Board 
Guidebook, at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp.irb (last modified June 21, 2004) [hereinafter IRB 
Guidebook].  
 29. World Medical Assembly, Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Physicians in 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964), available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ 
ethics/helsinki/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). The Declaration of Helsinki was first adopted by the 18th 
World Medical Assembly (WMA) in Helsinki, Finland, in 1964. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at 
Intro., Part A. The Declaration was subsequently revised by the 29th WMA in Tokyo, Japan, in 1975 
and again in 1989, by the 41st WMA in Hong Kong. Id.  
 30. See Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who’s Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of 
Research Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 896 (2003).  
 31. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at Intro., Part A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/11
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Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS))32 in July of 1974.33 In that same year, Congress enacted 
the National Research Act of 1974.34 The Act created the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (National Commission).35 The purposes of the 
National Commission were to study the problems attendant to human-
subject research and propose guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects.36 To oversee human-subject protection, the National Commission 
also established the Office for the Protection of Research Risks (OPRR) 
(now the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)) within the 
NIH.37  
In 1978, the National Commission published the Belmont Report.38 
The critical contribution of the Belmont Report was the establishment of 
three ethical principles: (1) respect for persons,39 (2) beneficence,40 and (3) 
justice.41 Today, these three principles serve as a foundation for the federal 
 32. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was created under President Eisenhower 
on April 11, 1953. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Historical Highlights, at http://www.os. 
dhhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). In 1979, the Department of Education 
Organization Act separated the Department of Health, Education and Welfare into two different 
departments: the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. For 
the purposes of this Note, the term Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) will be used to 
refer to the previously-existing Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the current 
Department of Health and Human Services. For a general history, see the Department of Health and 
Human Services webpage, at http://www.os.dhhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). 
 33. Id.; see Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (May 30, 1974) (codified as 
amended at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2003)). 
 34. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 201, 88 Stat. 342 (1974). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. § 202(a). The National Commission met from 1974 to 1978. IRB Guidebook, supra note 
28, at Intro., Part A. It issued reports and recommendations regarding basic ethical principles for 
conducting biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects to ensure that research was 
conducted accordingly. Id.  
 37. In June 2000, the protection of human research subjects was transferred from the Office for 
the Protection of Research Risks (OPRR) to the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), 
which is housed under the Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 65 Fed. Reg. 
37,136–03 (June 13, 2000). 
 38. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Nat’l Comm’n for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/ 
guidance/belmont.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). The Report was named after the Belmont 
Conference Center at the Smithsonian Institution where the discussions regarding the contents of the 
report were held. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at Intro., Part B.  
 39. “Respect for persons involves a recognition of the personal dignity and autonomy of 
individuals, and special protection of those persons with diminished autonomy.” IRB Guidebook, 
supra note 28, at Intro., Part B.  
 40. “Beneficence entails an obligation to protect persons from harm by maximizing anticipated 
benefits and minimizing possible risks of harm.” Id.  
 41. “Justice requires that the benefits and burdens of research be distributed fairly.” Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regulations governing human-subject research.42 Each principle has been 
enlivened into federally codified human research safeguards: respect for 
persons translated into informed consent; beneficence is viewed as risk-
benefit assessment; and justice is explained as fair selection of research 
subjects.43  
Seeing the need for explicit federal guidance, in 1981 the DHHS 
revised the regulations for protecting human subjects and codified them at 
Title 45, Part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.44 In 1991, wanting 
even more concrete federal safeguards, the DHHS adopted the Federal 
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects as part of the revisions.45 
These collective regulations became known as the “Common Rule”46 and 
have been promulgated by the seventeen federal agencies that conduct, 
support, or regulate human-subject research.47  
The Common Rule is a set of federal regulations that incorporates the 
ethical principles and guidelines of the Belmont Report and standardizes 
human-subject protections among the different federal agencies and 
departments.48 Additional protections for vulnerable populations—
pregnant women, handicapped or mentally disabled persons, prisoners, 
and children—have also been adopted by the DHHS.49 The responsibility 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. In keeping with its congressional mandate, the National Commission also distinguishes 
between “practice” and “research.” Id. The Belmont Report is thus divided into two parts: (1) the 
distinction between practice and research and (2) ethical principles. Id. Practice involves enhancing the 
well-being of an individual through interventions that have a reasonable chance of success. Id. Medical 
or behavioral practice encompasses diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy. Id. Research includes 
actions designed to test a hypothesis, make conclusions, and contribute to the generalizable 
knowledge. Id. Research is usually described in a protocol, detailing the objective and procedures 
employed. Id. “[E]xperimental procedures do not necessarily constitute research.” Id. It is also possible 
for practice and research to occur concurrently. Id.  
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 46. 
 45. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at Intro., Part A. 
 46. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Ethical and Regulatory Guidance for Research with Humans, in 
ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH, supra note 27, at 25, 27. 
 47. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at Chap. 2, Part A. These federal agencies and departments 
are: (1) Department of Agriculture, (2) Department of Energy, (3) National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, (4) Department of Commerce, (5) Consumer Product Safety Commission, (6) 
International Development Cooperation Agency, (7) Agency for International Development, (8) 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, (9) Department of Justice, (10) Department of 
Defense, (11) Department of Education, (12) Department of Veterans Affairs, (13) Environmental 
Protection Agency, (14) Department of Health and Human Services, (15) National Science 
Foundation, (16) Department of Transportation, and (17) Central Intelligence Agency. Id.  
 48. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.124. 
 49. See 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subpart B (establishing guidelines for research related to fetuses, 
pregnant women, and in vitro fertilization); Subpart C (establishing guidelines for research involving 
prisoners); Subpart D (establishing protections for children as research subjects).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/11
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of enforcing institutional compliance with the Common Rule has been 
delegated to the OHRP.50  
C. The Common Rule 
There are three essential requirements of the Common Rule: (1) 
assurances, (2) institutional review boards, and (3) informed consent.51 
First, any institution that conducts federally funded human research must 
submit a written assurance to the sponsoring agency that its researchers 
will comply with all of the requirements of the Common Rule.52  
Second, the Common Rule mandates that all research institutions that 
receive federal funds for human research establish one or more IRBs.53 
IRBs are composed of at least five members with varying backgrounds.54 
An IRB reviews the proposed research protocols and informed consent 
forms in light of institutional commitments and regulations, applicable 
law, and standards of professional conduct and practice.55 As such, an IRB 
needs members with expertise in these different areas; an IRB cannot 
consist entirely of members of one profession,56 and at least one member 
must not be affiliated with the institution in any way.57  
In reviewing research, an IRB is allowed to approve, require 
modifications of, or disapprove research protocols,58 and must notify the 
 50. IRB Guidebook, supra note 28, at Chap. 2, Part A.  
 51. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56; 45 C.F.R. § 46. 
 52. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(1) (requiring “[a] statement of principles governing the institution in 
the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research 
conducted at or sponsored by the institution, regardless of whether the research is subject to federal 
regulation.”). 
 Until December 2001, the OHRP approved three types of assurances: Single Project Assurances 
(SPAs), applying to a single research activity at a single location; Multiple Project Assurances 
(MPAs), pertaining to multiple, often unrelated, research activities at a single location; and 
Cooperative Project Assurances (CPAs), encompassing multiple research activities at multiple 
locations. Alvino, supra note 30, at 899–900. After December 2001, a new type of assurance became 
available—the Federal Wide Assurance (FWA). Id. A valid FWA is kept on file with the OHRP and 
can be used to receive funds from any department or agency that subscribes to the Common Rule 
without filing any additional assurances. Id. FWAs streamline the process for researchers seeking 
approval; as such, SPAs, MPAs and CPAs will be replaced with FWAs as they expire. Id.  
 53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103(b)(2), 46.107. 
 54. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (“The IRB shall be sufficiently qualified through . . . the diversity of 
its members, including consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to such 
issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and counsel in safeguarding the rights 
and welfare of human subjects.”). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. § 46.107(b). 
 57. Id. § 46.107(d). In addition, an IRB member who has a conflicting interest is not allowed to 
participate in the IRB’s initial or continuing review of that research. Id. § 46.107(e).  
 58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a). 
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investigators and the institution in writing of its decision regarding the 
proposed research activity.59 If the IRB disapproves a research protocol, it 
must give a statement of the reasons for its decision and allow the 
investigator an opportunity to respond in person or in writing.60 An IRB 
must also conduct continuing review of ongoing research at intervals 
appropriate to the degree of risk, but not less than once per year.61  
Before approving research, the IRB must ensure that the following 
criteria are satisfied: (1) the risks to subjects are minimized; (2) the risks to 
subjects are reasonable relative to the anticipated benefits; (3) subject 
selection is equitable; (4) informed consent is sought from each 
prospective subject or a legal guardian thereof; (5) informed consent will 
be appropriately documented; (6) provisions exist for monitoring data to 
ensure subject safety; and (7) provisions exist to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of subjects.62 In addition, an IRB or the affiliated institution 
should maintain documentation of the IRB’s activities, including all 
research proposals reviewed, minutes of IRB meetings, records of 
continuing review, and correspondences between the IRB and 
investigators.63 
Last, the Common Rule requires informed consent, whereby an 
investigator must obtain legally effective informed consent before 
involving a human being as a research subject.64 For consent to be 
considered valid, the prospective subject or her legal representative must 
have sufficient opportunity to consider whether to participate, and the 
consent information must be stated in language understandable to the 
subject or the representative.65 Informed consent forms cannot include 
language that waives or appears to waive any of the subject's legal rights, 
or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the 
institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.66 Each subject must 
also be provided with a description of the research; an explanation of risks, 
benefits, and alternatives; a discussion of confidentiality; a list of contact 
people; and a statement that participation is voluntary and may be 
discontinued at any time.67 
 59. Id. § 46.109(d).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 46.109(e).  
 62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)-(7). 
 63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.115. 
 64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a), (b); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a), (b). The Food and Drug Administration 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/11
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D. Negligence Actions by Injured Research Subjects  
The Common Rule does not provide an express cause of action for 
researcher negligence.68 To prove negligence, an injured subject must 
prove that there was a special relationship between the researcher and the 
subject that imposed a duty upon the researcher.69 Looking to the medical 
context, there are two alternate negligence actions under which health care 
providers can be liable: informed consent70 and medical malpractice.71 
Researcher liability can be based on these same two causes of action.72  
(FDA) declined to adopt the Common Rule, but rather issued its own set of regulations for research 
involving human subjects. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2004). These regulations established oversight for 
research involving experimental drugs, biological products and medical devices subject to FDA 
approval. Id. In contrast to the Common Rule, the FDA directives deal with only two main areas of 
regulation: informed consent and IRBs. See 21 C.F.R. § 50 (setting forth the requirements for informed 
consent, including special provisions for prisoners); 21 C.F.R. § 56 (establishing provisions for IRBs). 
For additional FDA regulations relevant to IRBs, see 21 C.F.R. § 312 (Investigational New Drug 
Application), 21 C.F.R. § 812 (Investigational Device Exemptions), and 21 C.F.R. § 860 (Medical 
Device Classification Procedures). 
 68. The Common Rule only provides that violating federal regulations may result in a loss of 
federal funding and, consequently, suspension or termination of research. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.113–.123; 
see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.113 (regulating suspension or termination of IRB approval under the FDA).  
 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314a (1965) (describing four commonly 
recognized special relationships where an actor owes a duty to another: (1) common carrier-passenger; 
(2) innkeeper-guest; (3) landowner-invitee; and (4) certain custodial relationships); see also Roger L. 
Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed Consent and 
Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 236–38 (2003). 
 To prevail in a negligence action against a researcher, the injured subject must establish: (1) a 
duty is owed by the defendant; (2) the duty was breached; (3) the breach caused injury to the subject; 
and (4) a cognizable injury. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 30, at 164–65 (5th ed. 1984).  
 70. In the health care setting, obtaining a patient’s informed consent before providing medical 
treatment is a general duty owed by physicians to patients. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A 
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 29 (1986). To establish negligence in medical 
informed consent actions, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the physician owed a duty to disclose 
information to the patient; (2) the physician breached the duty under the appropriate standard of 
disclosure; (3) the plaintiff was injured; (4) the injury was the result of an undisclosed outcome or risk; 
and (5) had the plaintiff been informed of the outcome or risk, the plaintiff would not have consented. 
Id. Lack of informed consent is usually treated as professional negligence, and arises from a 
physician’s duty to provide patients with the necessary information before they consent to treatment. 
Id.  
 71. Id. Malpractice, or professional negligence, is a special kind of negligence whereby 
professional standards of care are applied to persons possessing or claiming to possess special 
knowledge or skill. Id. Medical malpractice occurs when a physician fails to exercise the required 
degree of care, skill, or diligence that is ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in 
the same medical specialty, acting under the same or comparable circumstances. Id. See 1 BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 269 (2d ed. 2000); see, e.g., Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 828 P.2d 
597, 601 (Wash. App. 1992). It is important to note that a physician’s exoneration from liability for 
medical malpractice does not forestall a plaintiff’s claim of failure to obtain informed consent, and 
vice versa. Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 951–52 (Wash. 1999).  
 72. Thus, there are two distinct types of researcher negligence: informed consent and researcher 
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Injured research subjects usually sue under an ordinary negligence 
theory.73 Most human-subject research claims allege that the plaintiff was 
not informed that she was participating in a research study and/or that the 
particular risk that occurred had not been explained to her.74 Alternatively, 
there have been cases of “malresearch” (similar to medical malpractice) in 
which the allegation is physical injury due to negligent medical 
intervention during participation in a study.75  
Recently, courts have attempted to develop a specific analysis for 
causes of action in human-subject research. In Whitlock v. Duke 
University,76 a North Carolina federal district court focused on the duty 
and standard of care for negligence actions based on informed consent 
under the Common Rule.77 The court held that under the Common Rule, 
there is a heightened duty for disclosure of foreseeable risks that differs 
from that in the medical malpractice context.78 The court concluded that 
malpractice. Courts might choose to strictly follow or modify the standards used in the health care 
setting—for both informed consent and medical malpractice—when faced with an injured subject in 
the research context. See supra notes 70–71.  
 73. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).  
 74. BENDER, supra note 17, at § 23.08. Usually with these types of allegations, the subject is also 
the investigator’s patient and the investigator did not make clear to the patient that the treatment was 
also research. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Sexton v. United States, 644 F. 
Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1986); Schwartz v. Boston Hosp. for Women, 422 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 
Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 
N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).  
 75. See, e.g., Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Blanton v. United 
States, 428 F. Supp. 360 (D.D.C. 1977); Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 377 N.E.2d 
215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Brook v. St. John’s Hickey Mem’l Hosp., 368 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1977); Field v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 469 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1984); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 272 N.Y.S.2d 
557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Salathiel v. New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Barrett v. New 
York, 378 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Ct. Cl. 1976).  
 76. 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986). The plaintiffs filed suit in the Middle District of North 
Carolina, naming the researcher and the University as defendants. See id. at 1463, 1465. The plaintiff 
sought to recover for injuries sustained by participating in the experiment. Id. at 1463. The study, 
conducted at Duke University, was a deep sea diving experiment designed to research high pressure 
nervous syndrome. See id. at 1465. 
 77. Id. at 1471–72, 1475. 
 78. Id. at 1471. The court considered whether to apply the North Carolina statute (N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 90-21.13(a)) or the federal regulations (45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2)) to the injured-subject claim. 
Id. The court, drawing from support in the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, 
concluded that the appropriate standard would be the higher standard found in the federal regulations: 
Two important differences to note between the Nuremberg Code and § 90-21.13 are that the 
subjective consent of the subject is always required under the Nuremberg Code whereas 
under § 90-21.13 a health care provider may escape liability if a reasonable person would 
have consented if the proper disclosure of information had been made; and more importantly 
for purposes of this case the Nuremberg Code requires the researcher to make known to the 
subject all hazards reasonably to be expected and the possible effects upon the health and 
person of the subject whereas § 90-21.13 only requires the health care provider to apprise the 
patient of the “usual and most frequent risks and hazards” of the procedure. . . . [T]he Court 
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the Common Rule was the appropriate standard of care for informed 
consent claims by human research subjects.79 
In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,80 Maryland’s highest 
court identified several potential sources of the duty researchers owe to 
human subjects.81 Those sources include the special relationship between 
the research investigator and the subject, the informed consent quasi-
contract, the implied duties from the federal regulations, and duties from 
international codes.82 The Grimes court concluded that researchers may 
owe human subjects a duty of care, yet it did not explicate sufficiently 
which one of these sources gives rise to the duty.83 Grimes was, however, 
the first case to hold that the researcher-subject relationship itself 
constitutes a “special relationship” comparable to the physician-patient 
relationship.84 
E. Recent Abuses in Human-Subject Research  
While the case law regarding researcher negligence actions and the 
attendant duty of care is undeveloped and courts are struggling to deal 
with these issues, injury and even death of research subjects continues. For 
example, in September 1999 Jesse Gelsinger, a participant in a research 
study at the University of Pennsylvania’s Institute for Gene Therapy, died 
from multiple organ-system failure, which was a result of the research 
treatment he received.85 Following Gelsinger’s death, his family filed a 
civil suit alleging negligence in performing the research treatment and lack 
of informed consent concerning a conflict of interest.86 The conflict of 
concludes the degree of required disclosure of risks is higher in the nontherapeutic context 
[i.e. research context] than required under § 90-21.13 [i.e. health care context]. 
Id.  
 79. Id. The court did not, however, reach the question of whether a duty of care is implied by the 
Common Rule because it found that the Common Rule’s standard of care had not been breached by the 
researcher. Id. at 1475.  
 80. 782 A.2d at 858.  
 81. Id.; see also infra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.  
 82. 782 A.2d at 858.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. The court stated that “the very nature of nontherapeutic scientific research on human 
subjects can, and normally will, create special relationships out of which duties arise.” Id. at 834–35.  
 85. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 220. Gelsinger was involved in clinical research testing a 
new approach to treatment of ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency (OTC), a rare metabolic disorder. 
Id. He suffered a relatively mild form of OTC. Id. As part of the research, Gelsinger received 
injections of a virus which was to carry new genetic material into his system to treat the OTC. See id. 
The injected virus was the cause of Gelsinger’s multiple organ-system failure, which ultimately lead to 
his death. Id.  
 86. Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Penn. (Phila. Cty. Ct. of C.P. filed Sept. 18, 2000), at 
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interest, whereby the researchers stood to financially gain from the 
successful use of a patent associated with the research, was not disclosed 
to the subjects.87 In addition, the complaint alleged that the informed 
consent process did not fully disclose the risks; Gelsinger believed that the 
risks were minimal and the potential benefits were great.88 In reality, the 
risks were significant and the possible benefits to the subject were not as 
pronounced as the financial benefit for the researchers.89 The researchers 
also allegedly altered the IRB-approved FDA consent form by deleting 
information about the deaths and illnesses of monkeys in prior animal 
studies.90 
In July 2000, the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center in 
Tulsa was shut down because of inadequate protections for human 
research subjects during a cancer research study testing a melanoma 
vaccine.91 Injured subjects in the melanoma study filed suit in federal 
district court,92 naming the primary investigator and all members of the 
http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). The Gelsingers named the 
trustees of the University, the primary investigator, the company sponsor, and the former medical 
school dean as defendants. Id. The complaint alleged that the virus used to carry the genetic material 
into Gelsinger’s system was a more dangerous way than other possible means of transporting the 
genetic material. Id. Interestingly, the researchers patented the virus used in the research, suggesting a 
possible conflict of interest between the research subjects’ well-being and the researchers’ financial 
gain from use of the patent. Id.  
 87. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 220. The complaint alleged the following causes of 
action: wrongful death, assault and battery linked to a lack of informed consent, and common law 
fraud and misrepresentation associated with deficiencies in the informed-consent process. Id. The IRB 
that reviewed and approved the protocol was not, however, named as a defendant. Id. The parties 
reached a settlement on November 3, 2000. Id. at 221. 
 88. Id. at 220. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 221. The IRB at the Center approved the melanoma research protocol. Id. Many of the 
patients who enrolled in the study had advanced melanoma, a virulent form of skin cancer, and had 
been unresponsive to standard therapies. Id. The patients had been given life prognoses ranging from 
two to six months. Id. Ninety-four patients received the vaccine and twenty-six subjects died during 
the course of the study. Id. However, none of the deaths were attributed to the vaccine itself. Id.  
 The experiment attracted public attention because the study’s nurse coordinator, Cherlynn 
Mathias, contended that there were problems with quality control, patient care, reporting of adverse 
events, and adherence to the study’s protocol. Id. Mathias’s formal presentation to the head of the 
department of surgery and the director of the office of research triggered an outside audit. Id. The audit 
found violations of good manufacturing practice, good clinical practice, and FDA requirements. Id. 
Mathias persisted, approaching federal regulators with her concerns. Id. An investigator from the 
OHRP notified the University of Oklahoma of the serious allegations of noncompliance with 
protections for human subjects. Id. The OHRP found that the IRB regularly failed to continually 
review almost all research protocols, including the one in question. Id. It also found that the IRB 
lacked information regarding subject recruitment and enrollment, subject selection, privacy and 
confidentiality protections, and additional safeguards for vulnerable subject populations before 
approving the research. Id.  
 92. Vida Foubister, Clinical Trial Patients Sue IRB Members, 44(8) AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 26, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/11
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IRB as individual defendants.93 The plaintiffs contended that because the 
defendants failed to comply with federal regulations for the protection of 
human research subjects and notify the plaintiffs of this failure, “the 
plaintiffs’ involvement in the study was without their consent.”94 Plaintiffs 
also claimed violations of both their constitutional privacy right “to be 
treated with dignity” and their due process liberty interest.95 The court 
found that no private right of action existed for alleged violations of 
international laws, such as the Declaration of Helsinki96 and the 
Nuremberg Code,97 that protect human research subjects.98 According to 
the court, the appropriate standard in the United States for conducting 
research on human subjects is contained in the Code of Federal 
Regulations; yet, even under the Code of Federal Regulations, the court 
found no private right of action.99 
Only a year later, in 2001, the OHRP investigated Johns Hopkins 
University (Johns Hopkins) because a healthy, twenty-four year old, Ellen 
Roche, died while participating in an asthma study.100 The OHRP found 
the researcher at fault “for inadequately researching the drug used in the 
study.”101 In addition, the OHRP cited the Johns Hopkins IRB for 
2001), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/02/26/prsb0226.htm. 
 93. Robertson v. McGee, No. 01CV60, 2002 WL 535045 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2002).  
 94. Id. at *2.  
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.  
 98. Robertson, 2002 WL 535045, at *2.  
 99. Id. at *3 (“Within 21 C.F.R. §§ 210, 211 and 45 C.F.R. § 46, there is a comprehensive 
enforcement scheme provided to the FDA, accordingly there is no private right of action enforceable 
under § 1983.”). 
 Interestingly, the IRB defendants claimed qualified immunity as state actors against the plaintiffs’ 
claim of not being treated with dignity. Id. at *4. The court affirmed that state actors performing 
discretionary functions can be shielded from liability under qualified immunity if their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have 
known. Id. The court did not reach the question of whether the IRB members had violated any rights, 
because they could find “no federal law which recognizes a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 ‘to be treated with dignity’ for persons who agreed to participate in a medical research project 
sponsored by a state university.” Id.  
 100. Report on a Research Death Faults Review Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A16 
[hereinafter Report on Research Death]. 
 101. Daniel J. Powell, Using the False Claims Act as a Basis for Institutional Review Board 
Liability, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2002) (citing Letter from Patrick McNeilly, Compliance 
Oversight Coordinator, Division of Compliance Oversight, HHS, and Michael Carome, Director, 
Division of Compliance Oversight, HHS, to Edward Miller, Dean and Executive Chief Officer, Johns 
Hopkins Medicine, Chi Van Dang, Vice Dean for Research, The Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, 
and Gregory F. Schaffer, President, The Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center (July 19, 2001), 
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm_letrs/jul01a.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002)). “It 
appears that previous versions of textbooks had indicated that the drug used to induce asthma was 
toxic in humans, and that a more exhaustive review of the literature would have revealed that the 
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significant violations of federal regulations—the IRB did not “obtain 
adequate information to evaluate the risks of the research protocol, did not 
satisfactorily review ongoing research, failed to fully consider the needs of 
vulnerable subjects, and kept insufficient records of its meetings.”102 Due 
to these violations, the OHRP stopped all federally funded research at 
Johns Hopkins for several days until Johns Hopkins officials established a 
proposal addressing the OHRP’s concerns.103  
A Johns Hopkins-affiliated research institution, Kennedy Krieger 
Institute, Inc. (KKI), studied the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead 
paint abatement modifications on homes, using young children as the 
human research subjects.104 The consent forms did not disclose that the 
child might accumulate lead in the blood, nor did the forms reveal that in 
order for the experiment to succeed it was necessary that the child remain 
in the house as the lead in the child’s blood increased or decreased, so that 
it could be measured.105 Most egregiously, the Johns Hopkins University 
Joint Committee on Clinical Investigation (the Johns Hopkins IRB) 
suggested to the researchers “a way to miscast the characteristics of the 
study in order to avoid the responsibility inherent in non-therapeutic 
research involving children.”106 The parents of two child-subjects brought 
two separate negligence actions alleging that KKI had a duty to warn the 
participants of the risks attendant to the research; the researchers breached 
this duty when they failed to warn parents in a timely manner or otherwise 
research protocol should have been modified.” Id. (citing Letter from Chi Van Dang, Vice Dean for 
Research, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and Gregory F. Shaffer, President, Johns 
Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, to Michael Carome, Division of Compliance Oversight, OHRP 
(July 13, 2001), available at http://www.sunspot.net/bal-hopkinsletters.htmlstory (last visited Feb. 7, 
2002)).  
 102. Powell, supra note 101, at 1404. 
 103. Id. at 1404–05. 
 104. Grimes, 782 A.2d 807. The researchers anticipated that the children would accumulate lead 
in their blood from the lead-bearing dust, which would help researchers determine the extent to which 
the various partial abatement procedures worked. Id. at 812–13.  
 “There was no complete and clear explanation in the consent agreements signed by the parents of 
the children that the research to be conducted was designed” to use the extent of contamination in the 
children’s blood as a proxy for the effectiveness of the abatement procedures. Id. at 813. 
 105. Id. at 824–25. 
 106. Id. at 813. In a letter to the researcher, the IRB pointed out that “[f]ederal guidelines are 
really quite specific regarding using children as controls in projects in which there is no potential 
benefit” to the children (i.e., non-therapeutic research, which is research that promises no direct benefit 
to the participant). Id. at 814. Because of this, the IRB encouraged the researchers to change the 
consent form to indicate that the control group was “being studied to determine what exposure outside 
the home may play in total lead exposure.” Id. Thus, the consent form indicated that the controls were 
receiving some benefit in discovering “whether safe housing alone is sufficient to keep the blood-
levels in acceptable bounds” (i.e., therapeutic research, which is research that promises a potential 
benefit to the participant). Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/11
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act to prevent the children’s exposure to the known presence of lead.107 
The court held that informed consent agreements in a non-therapeutic 
research context can constitute contracts, as well as special relationships, 
giving rise to duties.108 A breach of these duties by the researcher may also 
result in negligence claims.109  
III. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL IRB LIABILITY 
While current case law is beginning to establish the existence of a duty 
of care owed by a researcher and the applicable standard of care that an 
injured research subject must establish to recover under either an informed 
consent or research malpractice theory, the same has yet to be established 
for an IRB that approved the research protocol.110 IRBs are less than ideal 
defendants because of the uncertainty that an injured research subject faces 
regarding the duty owed by and the standard of care imposed upon an 
IRB.111 Consequently, there has never been a lawsuit filed against IRB 
members as a group for “negligent approval of a protocol” or any other 
claim of the sort.112  
Yet, naming IRBs as defendants may be a way for injured plaintiffs to 
intimidate IRBs and undermine their credibility if IRB members must 
testify at trial.113 One legal scholar suggests that the decision to sue IRB 
 107. Id. at 818. Both claims alleged that KKI discovered lead hazards that could cause lead 
poisoning in the homes of the participating families. Id. The plaintiffs further contended that they were 
not fully informed of the risks of the research. Id.  
 108. Id. at 858. 
 109. Regarding parental consent, the Grimes court held that a parent cannot consent to a child’s 
participation in non-therapeutic research that poses “any risk” to the subject: “We hold that in 
Maryland a parent, appropriate relative, or other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the 
participation of a child or other person under legal disability in nontherapeutic research or studies in 
which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the subject.” Id.  
 110. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 224. It might seem logical that if an IRB was to be sued, 
the usual negligence standard of care would be applied, i.e., what a reasonably prudent IRB member 
would have done in a similar situation. Id. Conceivably, though, this could become quite complicated 
given the diverse membership of the IRB. Id. Would an ethicist or philosopher IRB member be held to 
the same standard as a member who was a medical doctor or a lawyer? Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. See supra Parts II.D and E; see also BENDER, supra note 17, at § 23.08. 
 However, a report by the National Commission on IRBs alluded to the possibility that an IRB 
member could be held personally liable for negligent approval of protocols. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0008, at 82 (1978); 
see also 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (1978). 
 113. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 224. 
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members could be an efficient way for plaintiffs to cast the net as wide as 
possible and encourage settlement.114  
Aside from the uncertainty of suing an IRB due to the lack of clear 
definitions of duty and standard of care, the question arises whether an 
injured research subject should be able to hold an IRB liable, as individual 
members or as a whole, for approving the research protocol designed and 
performed by an independent researcher that led to the subject’s injury. In 
answering this question, several considerations are relevant.  
First, state peer review statutes may preclude IRBs from incurring 
liability.115 If the language of the statute is broad enough it may apply to 
IRBs as it does to other peer review committees.116 These types of statutes 
may not only protect the IRBs and its individual members, but the statutes 
might also shield IRB records and documents from discovery or admission 
into evidence.117 For example, an Illinois court held that the state peer 
review statutes’ definition of a peer review committee included IRBs; 
therefore, the IRB was not required to disclose documents requested by 
the plaintiffs.118  
 114. Id. (citing Foubister, supra note 92 (“It’s a strategy [referring to suing IRBs] that causes more 
people to get upset, and therefore encourages institutions to settle quicker.”)).  
 115. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01–44.1 (Michie 2001) (explicitly affording civil immunity to 
Virginia IRB members).  
 116. Medical Studies, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 (1994) (exempting from disclosure 
documents used by hospitals and other providers in the course of medical research, to encourage 
candid and voluntary studies and programs used to improve hospital conditions and patient care or to 
reduce the rates of death and disease in Illinois).  
 117. Doe v. Ill. Masonic Med. Ctr., 297 Ill. App.3d 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that 
documents used by an IRB during a medical study were privileged under the Illinois Medical Studies 
Act).  
 118. Id. The court found that:  
In addition to protecting all information used in the course of “internal quality control,” the 
Act’s plain language expressly protects all information used in the course of “medical study.” 
. . . Therefore, we presume that the legislature clearly intended that the statute’s purview was 
not restricted to peer review committees. The Act also limits the privilege to materials 
belonging to certain entities. Included among these are “committees of licensed or accredited 
hospitals.” The IRB is such a hospital committee.  
Id. at 243. 
 For an opposite result, see Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592 (D. Minn. 1993). The 
Minnesota statute in this case was narrower than the Illinois statute construed in Illinois Masonic 
Medical Center. Id. The Minnesota statute was expressly limited to peer review and the court found 
that it contained no privilege for medical study information: “An IRB . . . does not have peer review as 
its purpose. IRB’s are part of a highly regulated scheme designed to protect the rights and safety of 
human subjects. . . . The IRB does not review peers, it reviews research, approves specific 
investigational device exemption applications, [and] monitors the investigation’s progress . . . .” Id. at 
598. 
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Second, the obvious reason for imposing liability on an IRB would be 
to increase accountability for the IRB’s actions.119 Yet it is not clear that 
increased IRB monitoring will result in a decrease in adverse events in 
human research.120 In addition, the IRB is only a small part of the 
overarching framework for protecting human subjects. Institutions, 
sponsors, the government, and the clinical investigators who manage the 
studies also play critical roles.121 No amount of IRB scrutiny can safeguard 
against unexpected events, either due to the individual health of the 
particular subject or an oversight of an investigator.122  
Moreover, if liability against IRBs and its members were allowed, it 
would likely discourage people from becoming IRB members rather than 
motivating them to be more conscientious in reviewing and monitoring 
research protocols.123 Membership on an IRB does not give a member a 
 119. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 225 (“Legal liability is a perfectly ordinary means for 
ensuring that people and institutions meet their responsibilities. . . . [L]awsuits may be one of the few 
ways of expediting the needed changes [in the IRB system], as fear can often be a motivating force.”); 
see also J. Savulescu, I. Chambers, & J. Blunt, Does Setting Good Practice Standards for Research 
Ethics Committees Increase Their Legal Liability?, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 1833 (1997). 
 120. Robert Steinbrook, Improving Protection for Research Subjects, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1425, 1429 (2002) (quoting Helen McGough, director of the Human Subjects Division at the 
University of Washington in Seattle: “We have very poor data on the number of adverse events and 
whether there is any relation between the adverse events and the quantity and quality of IRB review.”).  
 121. Id. at 1425.  
The IRB cannot be viewed as a substitute or surrogate for a responsible, well-trained, caring 
investigator. No matter how much we improve our system of checks and balances, the 
primary responsibility for full and thoughtful disclosure, enrollment without coercion, 
monitoring of the conduct of the trial, reporting adverse events, and confidentiality must 
remain with the local primary investigator.  
Eve E. Slater, Editorial, IRB Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402, 1403 (2002). 
 122. See Donald S. Kornfeld, Correspondence, Institutional Review Boards Reform, 347 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1285, 1286 (2002). 
On the basis of my experience as a chairman of the IRBs at two major academic medical 
institutions for a total of 18 years, I would argue that serious risk to patients is more likely to 
be the result of human fallibility than of inadequate IRB procedures. Adequate IRB 
procedures could not have prevented the deaths of the student at the University of Rochester 
from an excessive dose of lidocaine, the volunteer at Johns Hopkins from the pulmonary 
damage inflicted by hexamethonium, the patient at the University of Pennsylvania from a 
genetically modified agent, or the nurse at Case Western Reserve from an overdose of 
methionine. These deaths were the result of a variety of human failings. The most zealous 
overhaul of IRB regulations and the expenditure of substantial sums to enforce them cannot 
avert the harm that results from unexpected events or is inflicted by an investigator’s 
sociopathy, hubris, or carelessness. 
Id. 
 123. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 225 (citing Foubister, supra note 92). 
Why would I even want to risk the chance of being named in a lawsuit? . . . With the amount 
of research done at any major research university or academic medical center, there will be 
people who have adverse events and there will be people who die. If the default is as soon as 
that happens the IRB gets sued, there will be no more IRBs and there will be no more 
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greater chance of promotion or tenure, nor does it increase outside 
funding.124 Additionally, IRB members do not get paid for their efforts, 
and reviewing research protocols requires a huge investment of time and 
energy.125 As such, the pool of potential IRB members from which an 
institution can draw is limited.126 This pool would become even smaller if 
liability for adverse research events was imposed upon IRB members.127 
Additionally, IRBs may become so risk-adverse that hardly any research 
will be approved.128 Consequently, one could easily imagine that IRBs 
could also face lawsuits alleging damage to the careers and reputations of 
investigators whose protocols were rejected.129  
Third, statutory language throughout the federal regulations hints that 
the drafters did not intend to allow injured research subjects to impose 
liability on IRBs. Under section 46.116 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, which addresses informed consent, research subjects cannot 
waive their legal rights or indemnify “the investigator, the sponsor, the 
institution or its agents from liability for negligence.”130 One might argue 
that an IRB could fall under the exempted “agent” category.131 Yet, this 
language might also suggest that Congress purposefully excluded IRBs 
from its indemnification list; if Congress had wanted to include IRBs in 
this section, it easily could have listed IRBs as a group which subjects 
research because you can’t do research without IRBs.  
Id. 
 124. Id. at 226. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., H. Edgar & D.J. Rothman, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond: Future 
Challenges to the Ethics of Human Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489 (1995); D.F. Phillips, 
Institutional Review Boards Under Stress: Will They Explode or Change?, 276 JAMA 1623 (1996); 
S.B. Putney & S. Gruskin, Time, Place and Consciousness: Three Dimensions of Meaning for U.S. 
Institutional Review Boards, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1067 (2002); L.E. Wolf, M. Croughan & B. Lo, 
The Challenges of IRB Review and Human Subjects Protections in Practice-Based Research, 40 MED. 
CARE 521 (2002). 
 127. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 225.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 reads, in part:  
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through 
which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the 
subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the 
institution or its agents from liability for negligence.  
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1), which provides: “Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall 
act on his behalf subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”  
 After selecting IRB members, the corresponding institution charges the IRB with the 
responsibility of protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects. See BENDER, supra note 17, at 
§ 23.02(1). As such, the institution is consenting to the IRB’s review and approval of research at that 
institution, and therefore entering into a fiduciary relation with the IRB as its agent. See id.  
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could not indemnify under section 46.116. Evidence suggests that the 
latter is true.132 Precisely because Congress did not specifically mention 
IRBs in this regulation, which discusses negligence actions and defendant 
targets, it is not likely that Congress contemplated IRBs as possible 
defendants in human research litigation.133 This idea is further supported 
by the fact that section 46.116 and sections 46.107–.115, which establish 
IRBs,134 were codified on the same day,135 suggesting that the drafters 
clearly had IRBs and their role in mind when crafting the regulations. 
Therefore, because Congress did not see the need to prevent 
indemnification of IRBs, it is even more likely that Congress did not 
expect IRBs to be sued by injured research subjects.136 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEMA FOR ACTIONS AGAINST IRBS 
A. Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule  
Given the lack of case law dealing with IRB liability, it is instructive to 
look to a more established area of law for an answer to how to deal with 
IRB member liability.137 Under corporate law, officers and directors have 
a duty of care138 whereby they must “discharge their duties in good faith 
and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinary prudent 
[persons] would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions”139 
 132. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. Subsections 46.116(c) and (d) specify how an IRB may approve a 
consent procedure that excludes or alters informed consent in certain circumstances. Given that 
subsections 46.116(c) and (d) specifically mention IRBs, yet IRBs are not listed as parties which 
cannot be released from liability for negligence under section 46.116, it seems that Congress clearly 
did not want to include IRBs as parties released from liability. This could be interpreted to mean that 
Congress neither anticipated nor desired negligence actions to be brought against IRBs. 
 133. Id.  
 134. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107–.115.  
 135. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107–.116. All the regulations were codified on June 18, 1991 and 
became effective August 19, 1991.  
 136. Id.  
 137. In the legal world, it is common to look to a separate area of law for answers in dealing with 
an area of law that is undeveloped or unsettled. For the remainder of the discussion, this Note will 
explain how corporate law principles used for board of directors liability can be useful in determining 
how IRB liability suits should be handled.  
 138. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984) (stating this duty in a way that is typical of 
the law in most states: “A director shall discharge his duties as a director . . . (1) in good faith; (2) with 
the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; 
and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 139. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14(a) (1969)). 
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when acting on behalf of the corporation.140 Under this duty of care, two 
types of fact patterns are possible: “(1) negligent specific decisions;141 . . . 
and (2) a failure of the board of directors to adequately supervise the 
operations of a corporation.”142  
The business judgment rule, however, provides a shield to officers and 
directors from their actions on behalf of the corporation.143 The business 
judgment rule provides that a court will not find a breach of duty of care 
solely because the director’s decision was unwise.144 Courts will not 
impose liability if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the officer or director 
had no conflict of interest in the matter decided;145 (2) the officer or 
director adequately informed him or herself about the relevant facts of the 
decision;146 and (3) the business decision was, in the director’s opinion, 
rational147 and in the best interest of the corporation at the time that it was 
made.148  
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Spec. Term. 1940) (holding bank directors 
liable for purchasing securities for the bank but giving the seller an option to buy the securities back at 
the same price and, in effect, risking a loss with no possible gain or interest derived from holding the 
securities); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS 141–43 (1995).  
 Generally, these kinds of decisions are protected from liability under the business judgment rule. 
Id. For further discussion on the business judgment rule, see infra notes 143–48 and accompanying 
text. 
 142. SELIGMAN, supra note 141, at 142. When directors are charged with a failure to adequately 
supervise, the business judgment rule is not normally available as a defense. Id. at 141–43. 
 143. See generally id. at 167–213. 
 144. Id. at 167. 
 145. Interest in a transaction is defined as being a party to the transaction, being related to a party, 
or otherwise having some financial stake in the transaction’s outcome that is adverse to the 
corporation’s stake. See A.L.I., PRIN. CORP. GOV., § 4.01(c) (1993). Where an interest is shown, the 
business judgment rule will not apply; any evidence of self-dealing by the director deprives the 
director of the business-judgment shield. Id. 
 The business judgment rule aims to protect honest cases, even if mistaken, of business judgment. 
Id. The rationale against self-dealing is that if a director has engaged in self-dealing, then he has not 
judged his decision on behalf of the corporation, but rather on behalf of his own objectives. Id. Self-
dealing is not what the business judgment rule was designed to protect. Id. 
 146. Informed decisionmaking means that the director gathered a reasonable amount of 
information about the decision before he made it. See id. Directors must educate themselves “prior to 
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.” Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 Under the informed decision requirement, most courts will hold that a director loses the benefit of 
the rule only if he was grossly negligent in the amount of information he obtained. STEVEN L. 
EMANUEL, CORPORATIONS 183 (2000). Thus, ordinary negligence in gathering information, will not 
be enough to impose liability. Id. Furthermore, a court will usually consider all of the surrounding 
circumstances (e.g., whether the decision had to be made in an extremely short period of time). Id.  
 147. A rational decision is one in which the director rationally believes his or her business 
judgment was in the corporation’s best interest. See A.L.I., PRIN. CORP. GOV., § 4.01(c)(3). Not only 
must the director actually believe that his or her decision was in the corporation’s best interest, but this 
belief must also be rational. Id. Rational is a different, lower standard than reasonable. Id. Rational 
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p1593 Stalcap book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] REVIEWING THE REVIEW BOARDS 1613 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conjunction with the business judgment rule, the duty of care only 
operates in the most egregious cases to impose liability.149 First, actual 
business decisions made by a director or officer will not be second-
guessed by a court as long as the decisions are rational, made in good-
faith, and based on reasonable information.150 Therefore, imposition of 
liability for breach of duty of care only arises where the director has failed 
to comply with reasonable procedures for making business decisions.151 
Second, most courts will impose liability only for “gross negligence” or 
“recklessness,” even if the director’s procedures are inadequate.152  
There are three rationales for using the business judgment rule to limit 
directors’ liability. First, innovation and risk-taking are essential to the 
growth and prosperity of the business industry.153 Without the business 
judgment rule preventing liability, risks would not be taken and the 
industry would never expand.154 Second, courts are ill-suited for judging 
whether a business decision was a rational one and, consequently, there is 
an increased potential for improper outcomes without the business 
judgment rule.155 Third, directors are, by their very nature, in poor 
positions to spread the costs of unfortunate outcomes or losses in the 
implies that the decision must be totally beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Id. Therefore, a 
decision that most people would agree is not a good idea may still be protected as rational under the 
business judgment rule. Id.  
 148. SELIGMAN, supra note 141, at 167. Under the business judgment rule, a court does not 
scrutinize the subjective decision itself. Id. Therefore, if a director makes a good faith effort to obtain 
the facts and makes a decision which is unwise, the director will likely not be liable for breach of the 
duty of care; the business judgment rule will protect the director. Id. at 167–70. On the other hand, a 
director who makes an unwise decision on behalf of the corporation, without attending board meetings 
or attempting to ascertain the facts, will likely be found to have breached the duty of care. Id.  
 149. See generally id. at 167–213. 
 150. EMANUEL, supra note 146, at 173–74. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 182. It is in the interest of the corporation for the directors to take rational risks on the 
corporation’s behalf. Id. If directors were not shielded from liability by the rule, they would be more 
conservative and risk-adverse, causing the overall economic performance of corporations to decline. 
Id.  
 Or, it is quite possible that if liability was imposed upon directors in all cases, it would be harder 
to find persons willing to serve in directorships. Id. Certainly, “no man of ordinary prudence would 
accept a trust surrounded by such perils.” Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847).  
 154. EMANUEL, supra note 146, at 182.  
 155. Id. Directors must engage in “risk/benefit calculus” when making business decisions. Id. 
Judges are not trained in this type of calculus, especially judging from hindsight. Id. Consequently, 
judges may reach inappropriate conclusions if they are allowed to evaluate business decisions. Id. “A 
reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of 
perfect knowledge.” Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). In addition, even if courts were 
suited to make these kinds of decisions, courts would not have the time required to engage in this 
calculus in every situation. EMANUEL, supra note 146, at 182. 
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ordinary course of practice, as opposed to company shareholders who can 
diversify their investments to prevent devastating losses if one investment 
has a bad outcome.156  
B. Application of Corporate Law Principles to IRBs 
There are clear parallels between corporate boards of directors in the 
business context and IRBs in the research context.157 Given the large size 
of both corporations and research institutions, it would be impractical for 
every member of a research institution or shareholder of a corporation to 
be involved in every decision that affected the institution or the 
business.158 As such, board members are appointed and entrusted to 
oversee the progress and well-being of the larger institution or corporation 
and make important decisions on behalf of the members or shareholders.159  
Therefore, the rationales behind applying the business judgment rule to 
corporations might readily justify using some variation of the business 
judgment rule in research institutions conducting human-subject 
research.160 First, research institutions are charged with creating and 
perfecting new means for diagnosing and treating the health and wellness 
of human beings.161 Yet, progress cannot be made without taking risks, 
using innovation, and trying new, albeit “unheard of,” techniques when 
developing research breakthroughs.162 Second, courts are not in a position 
to judge whether the approval of a research protocol that resulted in injury 
was rational given the relevant information; judges rarely have the 
scientific background and knowledge to understand the gravity of the 
proposed research, let alone determine if it was warranted in the given 
 156. EMANUEL, supra note 146, at 182. The point of holding directors liable is to spread the cost 
of the loss among more people. Id. But directors are poor cost-spreaders because directors, at best, 
only serve a few companies and cannot recoup the loss into the price charged for services—as opposed 
to other lines of work where the costs can easily be spread across many clients. Id. As a result, 
shareholders are in a better position than directors to spread the risk of business misjudgment by 
diversifying their portfolios. See generally Joy, 692 F.2d 880.  
 157. Compare supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text, with infra notes 160–65 and 
accompanying text (explaining the rationales behind the business judgment rule in the corporate law 
context and how these rationales are similar to those in the human-subject research context). 
 158. See generally EMANUEL, supra note 146, at 51–53. 
 159. Id.  
 160. See generally BENDER, supra note 17, at § 23.01(1). 
 161. See, e.g., Barnes Jewish Hospital, Mission, Vision and Values, available at http://www. 
barnesjewish.org/groups/default.asp?NavID=357 (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) (“We take exceptional 
care of people . . . . By advancing medical knowledge and continuously improving our practices.”).  
 162. This can be paralleled to the first rationale for applying the business judgment rule—using 
innovation and risk-taking—to promote the growth and prosperity of the business industry. See supra 
note 153. 
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situation.163 Third, IRB members have no ability to spread the costs of an 
unwise decision because they receive no compensation for serving as IRB 
members, nor are the members likely to have the resources to compensate 
injured subjects.164  
Consequently, IRB members can be likened to corporate board 
members and, accordingly, should receive protection from liability under 
some variant of the business judgment rule.165 Applying the three prongs 
of the business judgment rule to the research context, courts should not 
impose liability upon an IRB member if: (1) the IRB member had no 
conflict of interest in the approved protocol; (2) the IRB member 
adequately informed him or herself about the relevant facts, risks, and 
possible consequences surrounding the proposed research; and (3) the 
approval of the research was, in the IRB member’s opinion, rational166 and 
in the best interest of the research institution or research subjects at the 
time that it was made. This principle will hereinafter be referred to as the 
IRB judgment rule. 
Using the business judgment rule as a model would create the perfect 
balance between shielding an IRB from liability when it exercises correct 
judgment on the one hand, and imposing liability upon the IRB when it 
violates one of the business judgment tenets on the other hand. From a 
policy standpoint, this would increase IRB accountability while only 
imposing liability when the duty of care was not met. For example, 
applying the IRB judgment rule to Gelsinger,167 the IRB should not be 
held liable for negligent research treatment and lack of informed consent 
because it was the researchers who altered the original consent forms so 
they no longer complied with federal regulations.168 If, however, the 
Gelsingers could prove that the IRB did not properly inform itself 
regarding research activities or use the requisite rational judgment in its 
 163. The second rationale can be likened to courts’ inability to judge whether a business decision 
was a rational one. See supra note 154. 
 164. The third rationale is similar to the business director’s failure to spread the costs in the 
ordinary course of practice. See supra note 155. 
 165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 166. It is quite possible to use a “reasonable person” standard, as opposed to the “rational” 
standard. However, this Note uses the lower, rational standard given the likeness between the business 
and research contexts and the compelling need to encourage research developments. See supra note 
147. 
 167. Gelsinger, supra note 86. 
 168. Id. The researchers allegedly altered the consent form approved by the FDA by deleting 
information about deaths and illnesses of monkeys in prior animal studies. See supra note 90 and 
accompanying text. 
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continued review of the research study, the IRB might be held liable under 
the IRB judgment rule.  
In the situation involving the Oklahoma Health Sciences Center,169 the 
OHRP found that the IRB lacked information regarding “subject 
recruitment and enrollment, subject selection, privacy and confidentiality 
protections, and additional safeguards for vulnerable subject[]” 
populations before approving research.170 Clearly this is a violation of the 
second prong of the IRB judgment rule, whereby an IRB must be 
adequately informed before approving the research project; therefore, 
liability should be imposed.  
Applying the IRB judgment rule to the Roche171 case, the IRB should 
not be liable for approving the research protocol. Given the information in 
the approved proposal, the IRB was not likely to know the toxicity of the 
drug used in the study—specifically because the researchers did not 
disclose this information in their proposal.172 A rational IRB would likely 
have approved the research absent any showing of danger to the subjects.  
Employing the IRB judgment rule in the Grimes173 case would impose 
liability on the IRB because its members clearly violated the third prong of 
rationality and consequently breached their duty of care. It was not rational 
for the IRB to approve the protocol because it was obviously aware of the 
risks inherent in the study, as evidenced by its suggestion to miscast the 
study’s characteristics to avoid the responsibility associated with non-
therapeutic research involving children.174  
C. Alternatives for Improving IRB Operation and Function Without 
Imposing Liability  
In recent years, IRBs have been harshly accused of “reviewing too 
many protocols, reviewing protocols too quickly, having insufficient 
expertise, and providing too little training” for new members.175 There are 
several ways to improve the function and accountability of IRBs without 
imposing liability. First, the role and responsibility of the IRB should be 
defined more clearly in federal statutes.176 The statutes should explicate 
 169. See supra notes 91–99 and accompanying text. 
 170. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 9, at 221.  
 171. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 173. Grimes, 782 A.2d 807; see also supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.  
 174. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 175. Steinbrook, supra note 120, at 1426. 
 176. Anderlick & Elster, supra note 9, at 225–26. 
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whether IRBs should be held responsible for ensuring ethical research 
behavior or whether IRBs are merely acting as one step in realizing and 
addressing problematic components of research.177 Second, an increase is 
needed in the resources devoted to protecting research subjects to contend 
with the growth of federal and private clinical research expenditures.178  
Third, an increase in the number and types of IRBs would improve the 
current system.179 Educational programs for investigators and IRB 
members, additional staff, and programs for the protection of research 
subjects directed by senior officials could be beneficial as well.180 
Furthermore, institutions, especially those with multi-center studies, could 
increase the use of external review boards.181 Fourth, IRBs could increase 
the membership of unaffiliated members to better represent the human-
subject population.182 Finally, accreditation programs for the protection of 
research subjects could be imposed in a more standardized manner to 
encompass all institutions performing human-subject research.183 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. “From 1995 to 2000, the budget of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) doubled. 
President George W. Bush requested $27.3 billion for the NIH in fiscal year 2003, a 33 percent 
increase over the $20.5 billion budget for fiscal year 2001.” Steinbrook, supra note 120, at 1426. If the 
resources for IRBs do not increase at a rate greater than the current one, it is unreasonable to expect 
IRBs to review and approve the increased number of proposed research protocols. Id.  
 179. See Steinbrook, supra note 120, at 1428–29. Institutions such as Johns Hopkins and Duke 
University have increased both their spending and the number of IRBs to correct serious problems 
with their programs for protecting research subjects. Id. at 1428. “Between 1999 and 2002, 7 of the 11 
medical schools with the largest amount of NIH support for research established additional IRBs.” Id. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. The work load for participating institutions could be decreased by using external boards to 
review the overall research protocols for multi-center studies. Id. External review boards could also 
review certain types of protocols for single-center studies to lessen the IRBs workload or an external 
review board could be established to review a frequent type of study or to review certain studies that 
might require different expertise. Id.; see also, W.J. Burman, R.R. Reves, D.L. Cohn & R.T. Schooley, 
Breaking the Camel’s Back: Multicenter Clinical Trials and Local Institutional Review Boards, 134 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 152 (2001).  
 182. See Steinbrook, supra note 120, at 1428. “Current federal regulations require that each IRB 
have ‘at least one member who is not affiliated with the institution’” and that the board not be entirely 
comprised of one profession. Id.; see supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. However, the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) contends that one member may not be enough to 
avoid institutional bias, “especially because some IRBs have 15 to 21 members.” Steinbrook, supra 
note 120, at 1428. The NBAC recommends that IRB members who represent the perspective of the 
research participants and are not affiliated with the institution should represent 25% of the IRB 
membership. Id.  
 183. Steinbrook, supra note 120, at 1427. “The Joint Committee on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations . . . [has] accredited health care organizations for years.” Id. Since the early 1980s, 
accreditation programs for the protection of human research subjects have been recommended, but 
these programs were only initiated in earnest in 2001. Id. “Two private organizations are involved . . . . 
[First], the National Committee for Quality Assurance [NCQA] which accredits managed-care 
organizations and has started an accreditation program for the medical centers of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs.” Id. The program was created in response to the failure of the West Los Angeles 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Since the egregious violations that occurred during World War II, 
society has realized the need for regulation of research involving human 
subjects.184 Both international and national principles have been 
established to ensure that researchers adhere to minimum standards to 
protect the interest and dignity of human research subjects.185 In the 
United States, IRBs were created to oversee and approve protocols for 
research involving human participants.186 IRBs are responsible for 
protecting the rights of those participants, both before the research 
commences and during the research period.187 With the recent rise in suits 
alleging lack of informed consent or injury associated with research 
studies against researchers and their affiliated institutions, it will only be a 
matter of time before IRB members are commonly named as defendants in 
such suits. Therefore, establishing a framework for addressing IRB 
liability—whether that be the IRB judgment rule or an equivalent 
substitute—is indispensable.  
This Note proposes that IRBs be treated like corporate directors, 
allowing courts to apply a business judgment rule variant to cases alleging 
IRB member liability. Provided that an IRB member is a disinterested 
party to the approved research protocol; has made him or herself 
adequately informed about the relevant facts, risks, and possible 
consequences surrounding the proposed research; and his or her approval 
of the research was, in the IRB member’s opinion, rational188 and in the 
best interest of the research institution or the human subjects at the time 
that it was made, the IRB member should be shielded from liability if 
Veterans Affair Medical Center to improve research subject protections, and the resulting suspension 
of research involving human subjects there in March 1999. Id. Currently, the NCQA offers 
accreditation only to Veterans Affairs institutions, but hopes to expand to accredit other institutions as 
well. Id. Second, the Association of American Medical Colleges and six other groups founded the 
Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs (AAHRPP). Id. at 1428. 
Currently, accreditation under the AAHRPP is voluntary, but in time, it is hoped that accreditation 
under the AAHRPP could become standard practice. Id.; see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Preserving 
Public Trust: Accreditation and Human Research Participant Protection Programs, Washington, D.C. 
(National Academy Press, 2001); NCQA, VA Launch First Ever Accreditation Program for Human 
Research Protection (Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.ncqa.org/communications/news/ 
vahrpaplaunch.htm; AAHRPP “Open for Business,” Ready to Accept Applications for Accreditation 
(Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.aahrpp.org/nr_02-26-02.htm.  
 184. See supra Part II.A. 
 185. See supra Parts II.A, B, and C. 
 186. See supra Part II.A. 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 188. See supra note 166.  
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there is an adverse consequence resulting from the approved research 
study. In addition, there are more constructive ways of ensuring that IRBs 
are functioning in accordance with federal regulations and promoting the 
welfare of research subjects that do not require the imposition of liability 
for adverse research outcomes.189  
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